Like in the OECD world, international terrorism has gained highest priority on the security agenda of Southeast Asian nations since September 11. While terrorism is a new type of threat neither for Southeast Asia nor the OECD world, the challenge is its increasingly transnational organization and the fact that it is often directed against “soft” targets and civilians. Its rise, spread and efficiency as a type of asymmetric warfare is facilitated by new communication technologies, the use of global business networks and globalized traditional channels of remittances such as the hawala system (Zachary).
After September 11, 2001, Southeast Asia came into the focus of U.S. antiterrorism strategists. Catching their attention was the Islamic revival in the region which began in the 1980s and gained momentum in the 1990s, the region’s complex geography and porous borders, weak states, Islamic rebellions and ethnic strife. Some observers went so far as to liken Indonesia to another Afghanistan and the Abu Sayyaf to the Taliban. After the U.S. military action against the Taliban, reports circulated that al-Qaeda operatives and Arabs fighting for the Taliban were fleeing to Southeast Asia and getting involved in the ethnic conflicts in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. Other analysts feared that Southeast Asia with its weak and unregulated banking systems would become a financial hub for international terrorists. In short, Southeast Asia was proclaimed as the “second front” in the war against international terrorism.
A more sober analysis suggests that the threat perceptions circulating in the security community of the U.S., which are shared by Singaporean and Malaysian authorities, may be exaggerated. This is not to belittle real threats and the close connections Southeast Asian Islamists entertain throughout the region and with Middle Eastern countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, a closer look reveals that, despite their transnational links, terrorist activities are mainly homegrown. Although evidence of links between local terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM) and Abu Sayyaf to al-Qaeda exists, the cohesion and intensity of these links is difficult to gauge. Views portraying Southeast Asia as a launching pad and a haven for international terrorism seem to be as much off the mark as categorizing the MILF and Abu Sayyaf as “associate groups of al-Qaeda“(Gunaratna). Some of the sources cited by the proponents of the second front hypothesis come from rather dubious and murky sources. Recent assessments of the Muslim unrest in the South of Thailand also deny that international terrorist networks have any hand in it (Bünte).
While the risks caused by transnational terrorist networks are undeniable, it should also be taken into account that despite the Islamic revivalism, Southeast Asian Islam is still highly diverse and on the whole more tolerant than Middle Eastern brands (Hefner). Even the rise of Salafist and other puritanical Wahabite versions of Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia should not automatically be taken as an equivalent of terrorism. Although in Indonesia the number of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) has increased considerably over the last twenty years, only a small minority of them entertains links to terrorist circles.
The security risks caused by international terrorism in Southeast Asia have also been viewed in bleak terms because of the initial denial of the problem and inactivity by some governments in the region. Especially Indonesia, but also Thailand and the Philippines, were often blamed for their allegedly lacklustre efforts to fight international terrorism. While in some cases official denial of the problem may have been a tactical move to avoid retaliatory actions by the terrorists, in other cases, viz. Indonesia, the problem was real. However, since the Bali bombing Indonesia has passed an Anti-Terrorism Act and seriously stepped up its activities against terrorists.
Separatism as a security risk still exists, but overall – despite the recent outburst of violence in Southern Thailand – seems to be on the decline. Like in the European periphery, there was an upsurge of separatism and ethno-religious violence in Southeast Asia in the 1990s. Most affected by communal strife was Indonesia – which was seen by observers to be disintegrating and even labelled a “failing state.” Separatist rebellions raged in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, violent communal conflicts in Kalimantan, the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. They caused thousands of deaths and displaced hundreds of thousands. Some of these conflicts have now given way to a fragile peace.
One of the concerns of anti-terrorism experts is the link between terrorism, separatism, ethnic strife, piracy and organized crime. Links between separatism and terrorism exist, as the training of JI members in camps of the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) suggests. They also exist in areas of ethno-religious conflict such as Central Sulawesi, but they are less clear in the Moluccas and do not seem to exist in Aceh. A more visible relationship exists between separatism and international crime. Separatist forces as well as the government troops fighting them are engaged in arms smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal logging, protection rackets and money laundering. Most Southeast Asian states are thus still on the negative list of the OECD’s Finance Action Task Force (FATF). Here is also a link to international terrorism as terrorist cells may also make use of poorly supervised banking systems in their attempt to get access to funds for the purchase of arms and explosives. These risks also exist in the OECD world, although more effective monitoring and enforcement help to contain them.
Fragile democratization also poses security risks. These are certainly greater in Southeast Asia than in the OECD world. One reason is that democracy is deeply embedded in most OECD societies and even in Eastern Europe’s new democracies it is less fragile than in Southeast Asia. Although democratization has made considerable headway since the Philippine people’s power revolt, there are still several semi-democratic, socialist and outrightly authoritarian regimes in the region. Moreover, even the countries which have experienced democratic transition are often disparagingly categorized as “electoral democracies,” “defective democracies” or “delegative democracies.”
Convergent are also security problems related to international migration. In many Western countries, it is increasingly evident that the integration of migrant communities has not been a success story. Tensions and violent incidents are on the rise. Recent incidents in the Netherlands are only the top of an iceberg. Migratory problems have also dramatically increased in Southeast Asia. While in past centuries the region was repeatedly the destination of migratory waves, in much of the post-Second World War period it was mainly a sending region. This changed markedly under the impact of rapid modernization and inequitable growth in the region from the 1980s onward. Today Southeast Asia is a sending region and a destination of migrants at the same time. While Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma are still sending nations, Malaysia and Thailand have become sending as well as receiving countries, and Singapore is mainly a net receiver.
Other non-conventional security problems transcending borders are environmental problems such as haze, the loss of biodiversity and climate change. They are caused by illegal logging and swidden agriculture and in the past mainly originated from Indonesia. They have contributed not only to a marked increase of respiratory ailments in neighboring countries but also to enormous economic losses. Tourist arrivals have been adversely affected by the recent SARS epidemic, while AIDS/HIV infections are still on the rise in Burma and Indochinese countries. These security challenges are certainly more serious in Southeast Asia than in the OECD world, where international cooperation and more effective government responses have kept epidemics and environmental problems better in check. Economic crises, while not sparing the OECD world as the EMS crisis of 1992/1993 indicates, are considerably more serious in Southeast Asia. The Asian currency crisis of 1997/1998 and its socioeconomic consequences can probably only be compared with the Great Depression in the 1930s.
(Adapted from Ruland J 2004: The Nature of Southeast Asian Security Challenges)